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Abstract
China has embarked on a more sustainable path to becoming an industrialized 
and developed nation. The main drivers are the insecurity of fossil energy sup-
ply, widespread pollution, and acute water shortage caused by exploitation of 
coal in northern China. China is now a leading nation regarding deployment of 
green energy technologies. But at the same time coal-based power plants seem to 
be commissioned more extensively than prescribed in the Five-Year Plans. Many 
local governments favour short term economic growth and employment creation 
and resent more costly green policies, despite pressure from the central govern-
ment. In the coming decades, China will be the main contributor to the growing 
global energy consumption of especially oil, coal and nuclear power; it will also be 
the main contributor to global growth in CO2 emissions. However, recent policy 
initiatives launched by the central government aim to bypass the local opposition 
to greener development by introducing more economic incentives to reduce fos-
sil fuel demand. The outcome of these attempts to weaken federalist governance 
will be imperative for a more sustainable development of China's energy sector.
Keywords: China; Coal; Renewable energy; Energy governance
Introduction
China's energy consumption has multiplied in a few decades due to 
high economic growth rates. The energy sector relies heavily on coal, 
far more than most other countries. China's coal reserves are abundant 
and many local governments and industries prefer and protect this 
relatively cheap energy source in order to reap the short term beneﬁts 
in terms of economic growth and employment creation. However, the 
ﬂip-side of the coin is a seriously unsustainable form of growth, which 
may impede long term economic growth, unless the central government 
succeeds in its recent attempts to devise new incentives to reduce the 
demand for fossil fuels and embark on a more low carbon energy policy. 
14 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(1)•2015
Ole Odgaard _______________________________________________________________
Materials and Method
This article aims to provide a thorough overview of China's energy 
policy, its challenges and future national and global impact.  Particular 
attention will be given to the energy production and supply policies. 
A macro perspective will be applied, focusing on availability of energy 
resources and the policies employed to develop the energy supply sector 
in a sustainable way. The policies regarding ﬁnal energy consumption 
and energy efﬁciency will receive little attention in this analysis.
An important part of the analysis consists of quantitative assessments 
of China's energy policy and development. Data from the autonomous 
and internationally recognized International Energy Agency (IEA) will 
be used, as they are generated according to international standards 
and provide coherent and comparable information. China's National 
Statistical Bureau will also be a major data source. It is acknowledged 
that Chinese statistics are not without lacunae, and the data will be 
interpreted as trends rather than details.
The quantitative trends will be qualiﬁed in relation to policy dilemmas, 
national interest groups, resource constraints and other factors of impor-
tance for the development of China's future energy policies. Finally, some 
important key challenges are identiﬁed, which may be crucial indicators 
for the achievement of China's ambitious future green targets. 
The analytical method applied relies on the perception of China's 
political system as a 'fragmented authoritarian' mode of government. 
The energy policy-making process is thus conceived as protracted and 
shaped over a long period of time, and at the same time disjointed and 
inﬂuenced by different and loosely coordinated actors (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988). The quasi-federal role of local governments is also 
found to be of major importance in the implementation of energy poli-
cies. The local energy or environmental protection bureau may have re-
porting responsibilities to both the central government's resort ministry 
(e.g. Ministry of Environment) and to the local city mayor or provincial 
governor (Sinkule and Ortolano 1995: 10-21). This has signiﬁcantly 
strengthened local government bodies in the reform era since 1978.
China's Growing Energy Consumption
China has since the late 1970s had economic growth rates of almost 10 
percent annually. This has had a signiﬁcant impact on energy consump-
tion, which has increased more than ﬁvefold from 1980 to 2010. The 
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energy consumption is mainly based on coal. As shown in Table 1, coal 
has contributed with about 70 percent of China's energy consumption. 
The share has declined only marginally during the last decades, i.e. by 
about 8 percentage points in 30 years. 
TABLE 1. China's Energy Consumption and Energy Types, 1980-2012
Years
Energy  
Consumption  
(million ton coal 
equivalents)
Energy Consumption (%)
Coal Oil
Natural 
Gas
Non-fossil energy: 
renewable energy and 
nuclear power
1980 603 72.2 20.7 3.1 4.0
1990 987 76.2 16.6 2.1 5.1
2000 1,455 69.2 22.2 2.2 6.4
2005 2,360 70.8 19.8 2.6 6.8
2010 3,249 68.0 19.0 4.4 8.6
2011 3,480 68.4 18.6 5.0 8.0
2012 3,617 66.6 18.8 5.2 9.4
2013 3,750 66.0 18.4 5.8 9.8
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2014.
Note: The share of non-fossil energy ﬂuctuates naturally, as hydropower varies according to the 
annual depreciation. Non-commercial biomass used for heating and cooking in rural areas is 
excluded from the statistics.
Energy consumption has grown signiﬁcantly faster than expected. The 
Chinese government's long-term goal for energy consumption was that 
gross domestic product (GDP) should quadruple from 2000 to 2020, while 
energy consumption must only be doubled. However, energy consump-
tion doubled by 2008, almost three times faster than expected. 
This is due to high economic growth. The growth rates in previous 
Five-Year Plans seem to be continuously overtaken: the annual GDP 
growth rate was planned at 7.5 percent in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010), but the actual growth rate was 11.2 percent (World Bank 2013).
This sharp increase in energy consumption is clearly visible in the 
commissioned capacity of power plants. From 2005 to 2010, China in-
stalled an average of 1,800 MWel per week, mainly coal-based. China 
now uses twice as much coal as all OECD countries combined. In 2009 
and 2010, China's incremental demand equalled the EU's total coal 
consumption in 2010 (IEA 2012). While China in 1990 accounted for 
only a quarter of the world's coal consumption, in 2011 the proportion 
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increased to as much as 49 percent. By 2010, China overtook the USA 
to become the world's largest energy consumer (IEA 2012), and in 2011 
China accounted for 21 percent of global energy demand (IEA 2013b: 
572; 620). China doubled its share of the global energy demand in the 
course of just 20 years.
However, the share of non-fossil energy has been on the increase es-
pecially since 2007, which may signal a new trend. Hydropower is and 
is likely to remain the dominant source of renewable energy, but nuclear 
power and wind power are expected to gain market shares in the com-
ing years. It is noteworthy that in periods with high economic growth 
in China, the share of coal consumption increases, while a relatively 
low economic growth is often accompanied by a relative decline in the 
coal supply. Thus the share of non-fossil energy has increased from 8.0 
percent in 2011 to 9.8 percent in 2013.1  The question of whether this is 
a temporary phenomenon or a new trend warrants attention and will 
be discussed later in this article.
Urgent Need for a Reduction in Fossil Fuels
China's steady energy growth has relied on fossil fuels, despite an urgent 
need to embark on a more sustainable path. China has for several years 
been trying to reduce the use of fossil fuels, for at least four compelling 
reasons:
First, China's government is increasingly aware that China cannot copy 
the Western development model and that it has to embark on a 
more sustainable development path at an earlier stage. There are 
simply not enough natural resources available. This scarcity ap-
plies not only to energy, but also water and other resources related 
to exploitation of energy (ADB  2012). China's water resources per 
person are only one third of the global average (World Bank 2013a, 
Table 3.5). To make things worse, China's scarce water resources are 
very unevenly distributed, leaving 46 percent of China's population 
residing in northern China with only about 20 percent of the water 
resources to cater 65 percent of China's cultivated land (FAO 2011: 
227). Most of China's exploitation of coal  is located there, as are the 
majority of coal-ﬁred power plants. 
 China's energy sector embodies this dilemma. Coal-related indus-
tries such as mining production and power generation are extremely 
water-intensive. Coal mines depend on water to extract, wash and 
process the coal, while coal-burning power plants need water to 
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create steam and cool generating systems (Chan 2013).2 China's coal 
mining, processing and thermal power plants alone accounted for 
15-20 percent of all water consumed nationally in 2010.3 With the 
present policies, the coal sector will increase its share of the total 
water demand to 27 percent in 2020 (IRENA 2014: 35). The tangible 
dilemma is that there are seemingly limited alternatives to the ex-
pansion of coal-based industries in the already water-stressed areas 
in north and northwest China. More than 80 percent of China's coal 
reserves and 85 percent of the total power generation capacity lie in 
water-stressed or water-scarce regions (IEA 2013f; IRENA 2014).
 As of July 2012, China planned to construct 363 coal-ﬁred power 
plants, with a combined generating capacity exceeding 558 Giga 
Watt (GW) (WRI 2012). This amounts to an almost 75 percent in-
crease in coal-ﬁred generating capacity. Fifty-one percent of these 
new coal-ﬁred power plants would be built in areas of high or 
extremely high water stress.
 If all of the proposed plants are built, the coal industry is expected 
to withdraw as much as 10 billion m3 of water annually by 2015. 
That is more than a quarter of the water available for withdrawal 
every year from the Yellow River, which is already becoming 
depleted. Other major takeaways are limited, as 60 percent of the 
total proposed generating capacity is concentrated in six provinces, 
which only account for 5 percent of China's total water resources 
(WRI 2013). The total volume of water withdrawn by the Chinese 
power sector will grow from 102 billion m3 in 2010 to 124 billion m3 
in 2030 in a business-as-usual scenario.4 A decreasing reliance on 
coal is now a necessity, especially in the power sector. In the words 
of the IEA, 'Water constraints could make the expected increase in 
thermal power output unachievable' (2013: 95).
Secondly, China's supply of coal is also increasingly unstable due to 
logistical problems. The coal mines are located in northern and 
northwestern China, relatively far away from industrial centres in 
eastern and southern China. Transport constitutes a real bottleneck 
for coal, which already makes up as much as almost 50 percent of 
the total rail transport in China (Jianjun Tu and Johnson-Reiser 2012: 
4-6). In addition, coal is retrieved from ever deeper layers, and the 
new coal resources are located even further to the west. Since these 
factors increase costs, coal is imported from the world market. 
 China's domestic railway bottleneck could to some extent be solved 
by locating all new coal-ﬁred power plants near the coal mines in 
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northern and northwestern China. The electricity may then be trans-
mitted to the consumption centres in eastern China by ultra-high 
voltage lines. At the time of writing, this option is being considered, 
though it may prove unrealistic due to the acute water shortage in 
the coal-endowed areas. 
 Another option is to import the coal. China became a net importer of 
coal in 2009 and replaced Japan as the world's largest coal importer 
in 2011 (IEA 2013a). Net import of coal is expected to range at 7-8 
percent of the country's coal consumption until 2035. This net-import 
will average about 15 percent of the total trade of coal on the world 
market in this period. This is unlikely to be a problem, as many stable 
and politically friendly countries can cover this demand. However, 
the domestic supply situation is becoming increasingly complex.
Thirdly, China became a net importer of oil in 1993 and of natural gas in 
2007; it aims to reduce its increasing dependence on imports of natu-
ral gas and oil. China's fossil fuels reserves are low, and the security 
of supply is threatened by large future imports (see Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1. China's Net Imports of Energy Compared to the Total Energy 
Consumption: 1990-2035
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from the IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013, World 
Energy Outlook 2011, Gas Information 2013, Coal Information 2013, and BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy-June 2011.5
 The future demand for gas will rise sharply and precipitate a large 
import. From 2020 China would have to import almost 40 percent 
of its entire consumption of gas. China aims to ensure a stable 
and reliable import of natural gas, which appears to be a realistic 
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scenario, if handled properly. Major pipelines from neighbouring 
countries could cover more than half of the import requirements in 
2035. In addition, there are excellent opportunities for imports of 
liqueﬁed natural gas from countries and regions, such as Australia, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, which are generally politically stable or at 
least not likely to be a supply threat for China. Furthermore, China 
has potential for its own production of non-conventional gas in the 
form of shale-gas and coal bed methane, etc. 
 However, security of supply of oil is a serious concern. China now 
imports more than half of its oil, and the import dependence is 
projected to reach an alarming 77 percent in 2035. By 2013 China 
had overtaken the USA as the world's largest oil importer, and 
China will remain the global top importer for the foreseeable future 
(see Figure 1). China's two pipelines and the third presently under 
construction will cover barely 10 percent of the oil import demand 
in 2030. The vast majority must be imported from overseas, and 
almost half of China's oil imports come from unstable countries in 
the Middle East. This proportion has not declined in recent years 
despite imports from new supply countries. The oil import is China's 
Achilles Heel (Odgaard and Delman 2014). 
Fourthly, China is today one of the world's most polluted countries. The 
main cause of this is use of coal; coal accounts for 90 percent of the 
sulphur dioxide pollution and half of the particulate pollution (WRI 
2012A).6 Twenty of the world's 30 most polluted cities are located 
in China (World Bank & Development Research Center of the State 
Council  2012: 70). Less than 1 percent of the 500 largest cities meet 
the air quality standards recommended by the WHO (ADB 2012: 55). 
China has the highest exposure to air particle pollution (PM2.5) in the 
world.7  More than 110 million people live in cities, which are char-
acterized as 'very harmful' by the Ministry of Environment. Outdoor 
air pollution contributed to about 1.2 million premature deaths in 
2010 in China alone, and it currently ranks at number four among 
all risk factors contributing to the health burden in China (Health 
Effect Institute 2013). Air pollution has decreased life expectancy 
by 5.5 years among Northern China's 500 million inhabitants (Chen 
et al. 2013). Almost half of China's cities were exposed to acid rain 
in 2011 (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2012: 30). At least 10 
percent of the agricultural land is contaminated with heavy metals 
(Holdaway 2013: 275).
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 The costs of environmental degradation and resource depletion 
in China approached 10 percent of GDP in the past decade. If the 
external costs of pollution—in the form of increased medication ex-
penses, fewer food crops and environmental degradation etc.—were 
subtracted from GDP, more provinces today would have a nega-
tive economic growth rate instead of the published positive annual 
growth rates (World Bank & Development Research Center of the 
State Council 2012: 39). Pollution control costs will increase dra-
matically in the coming decades. In 2020 the costs of local pollution 
control for SO2, NOx and PM2,5 is expected to be twice as high as in 
2011, and in 2035 the costs will have at least tripled (IEA 2013: 41). 
Thus, the replacement of coal and oil by more sustainable energy 
sources is a key priority for China's overall development. This need 
has been acknowledged and addressed by the Chinese leadership 
in its new policies.
Challenges for Green Policy Initiatives
China has launched several, concerted attempts to develop more renew-
able energy and a domestic market for green energy technology. This 
development has been facilitated by new support mechanisms, adminis-
trative set-ups and progressive Five-Year Plans. The local governments 
and the largest energy companies are requested to establish additional 
wind turbines, hydroelectric plants and biomass-based power stations, 
and to improve the local environment and so forth.
In order to strengthen the phasing in of renewable energy, the 11th 
Five Year Plan (2006-10) endorsed the target of 10 percent renewable 
energy of the total energy consumption in 2010. However, this target 
was not achieved. The ﬁrst indication of this was, when the Chinese 
leadership in September 2009 introduced a target for non-fossil energy 
rather than renewable energy, i.e. nuclear power should be included in the 
target (Wang et al. 2011). Nevertheless, China achieved only 8.6 percent 
non-fossil energy in 2010 instead of 10 percent renewable energy. Since 
China has established a large capacity of nuclear power plants in recent 
years, there has been only a modest increase in the share of renewable 
energy, which is far below the planned outcome (see Table 2, below). 
China's ofﬁcial target of 15 percent renewables in 2020, according to 
the 'Medium and Long Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy 
in China', was also changed to 15 percent non-fossil sources (Run et 
al. 2011: 2746). Similarly, the renewable electricity targets for the 14 
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TABLE 2. Selected Targets for Energy in 5-Year Plans and Other 
Medium and Long-Term Plans
11th FYP
Target
(2010)
11th FYP
Actual 
result 
(2010)
12th FYP 
Target 
(2015)
2017
Target
2020
Target
M
an
d
at
or
y 
ta
rg
et
s
Share of non-
fossil energy in 
primary energy 
(renewables and 
nuclear energy)
10%
(RE only)
8.6% 11.4% 13% 15%
Energy 
consumption per 
GDP unit 
(= energy 
intensity) 
-20% -19.1% -16% - -
CO2 emissions 
per GDP unit 
(= carbon 
intensity)
- -20.5% -17% -
-40% to 
-45% 
compared 
to 2005
In
d
ic
at
iv
e 
ta
rg
et
s
Share of coal in 
primary energy 
consumption
- 68% 65% 65% 62%
Target for 
all 4 grid 
corporations:
Share of 
non-hydro 
renewables in 
total electricity 
consumption
1%
2 out of 4 
fulﬁlled 
target
- - 3%
Target for 14 
largest power 
companies:
Share of non-
hydro renewable 
capacity 
3%
7 out 
of 14 
fulﬁlled 
target
6.5% - 10%
Total primary 
energy 
consumption
(Million tons 
coal equivalents)
- 3,250 4,000 - -
Electricity 
consumption 
(TWh)
- 4,200 6,150 - -
Note: It is unclear whether the 2017 targets are mandatory or indicative.    
Sources: Collated by author from data drawn from several sources.8
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largest power companies and the 4 grid corporations stipulated in the 
'Renewable Energy Law' of 2006 were not met. The targets for renew-
able electricity generation were intended to help the development of 
non-hydro power renewable energy and they were, in contrast to the 
other targets, indicative and not mandatory.
Therefore, the share of non-fossil power generation has only been raised 
from 17 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2011. However, the under-fulﬁl-
ment of the renewable energy target does not imply that only a limited 
capacity of green energy technologies is being deployed. On the contrary, 
due to high economic growth, even a stagnant market share for renewables 
would actually represent a sharp increase in commissioned power gen-
eration equipment. But the ﬂip-side of the coin is that the commissioned 
capacity of coal-ﬁred power plants has increased even more. 
Surprisingly, in the ﬁrst years of the current Five-Year Plan (2010-
2015), actual coal consumption continued to grow so extensively that 
the attainment of the ofﬁcial goal for restricted coal demand was set 
against reasonable odds. In September 2013, the State Council revised 
an important target: the achievement of 65 percent coal of the total en-
ergy demand should now be met in 2017 instead of 2015 (see Table 2). 
Although the so-called 'Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action 
Plan' (State Council 2013) was launched as an active response to the 
widespread pollution in Chinese cities, it actually introduced targets that 
were more conservative and obsolete than some of the existing ones.
A plausible explanation could be that the postponement of the target for 
coal took into account that the coal-ﬁred power plant sector may expand 
more than planned. According to the Five-Year Plan of 2010-2015, a total 
of 300 GW of coal-ﬁred power capacity should be added from 2011 to 
2015. But in a detailed study the World Resource Institute has revealed the 
planning of 557 GW coal-ﬁred power plants in July 2012. This amounts to 
an almost 75 percent increase in coal-ﬁred generating capacity compared 
to the 45 percent increase detailed in the Five-Year Plan. However, not all 
of the approved coal power plants will be commissioned, as high market 
prices for coal and low, regulated prices for electricity often make it a 
loss-running business (Yang  2012). This factor has modiﬁed the expected 
boom in newly established coal power capacity, as supported by recent 
statistics. Sixty-six percent of China's total energy consumption was made 
up by coal in 2013 (see Table 1), thus the attainment of the targeted share 
of 65 percent in 2015 becomes feasible. One possible explanation for this 
adjustment is that the international economic crisis has slowed down 
China's growth and export of energy intensive industrial products more 
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than expected, similarly to the situation at the end of the 1990s when the 
share of coal declined during the low growth years, but when the normal 
high growth reappeared in the 2000s, the accompanying demand for 
energy brought back higher coal shares.
A noteworthy new regulation is that coal-ﬁred power plants will 
only be permitted if they cogenerate heat as combined heat and power 
plants. Nuclear power was supported by the target of 50 GW by 2017. 
Signiﬁcant progress for some targets should be possible in the coming 
years, provided the targets are followed through in implementing the 
more detailed action, i.e. by government support schemes and strict 
supervision of the actual implementation.
Thus, some key energy targets in the past Five-Year Plan have not 
been fulﬁlled at the local level, despite ambitious efforts and centrally 
orchestrated initiatives. But new central policies and lower economic 
growth may signal a new trend, though these are as yet unclear. How-
ever, IEA explicitly states that China's diversiﬁcation from coal all 
depends upon 'coal-to-gas and coal-to-liquid projects or projected coal 
bases linked through ultra-high voltage lines to areas of consumption' 
and  'a scenario of peak coal in China is only credible if economic growth 
in China is signiﬁcantly lower than assumed' (IEA 2014: 4-8). The most 
credible forecasts of China's long-term development is offered by IEA in 
its annual World Energy Outlook, which also offers comparable perspec-
tives via-a-via other countries and regions.
China's Energy Sector in a Global Perspective
The dramatic growth in China's total energy consumption has meant 
that China now contributes most to the incremental global demand for 
coal and oil and also therefore to CO2 emissions  (see Figure 3). This will 
continue in the future despite the new Chinese goals for more non-fossil 
energy and CO2-intensity improvement.
If all China's green goals are fulﬁlled, China's use of coal in absolute 
terms will still increase signiﬁcantly. The planned expansion of coal-
ﬁred power plants in the 12th Five-Year Plan will increase its capacity 
of coal ﬁred power plants by 45 percent, i.e. an additional capacity that 
is larger than the aggregate capacity of all coal ﬁred power plants in the 
EU. Even if China employs the most energy efﬁcient energy technologies, 
the use of coal will increase signiﬁcantly. From 2015 onwards, the major 
increase in China's coal demand will take place in the energy intensive 
industries, not in the power sector.
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China's increased coal consumption will account for almost 60 per-
cent of the global net growth from 2011 to 2020. Interestingly, China's 
FIGURE 2. China's Share of Incremental Growth in Global Energy and 
CO2-emissions: 2011-2035
Note: The scenario is based on the assumption that all China's ofﬁcial goals for increased non-fossil 
energy are attained, i.e. IEA's New Policies Scenario.
Source: Author's calculations based on IEA (2013B).
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= China's share of global energy consumption and CO2 emissions in 2011
incremental demand for oil and nuclear power will make up about 
half of the global net growth until 2020. In 2011 China accounted for 11 
percent and 4 percent of the global demand for oil and nuclear power, 
respectively. China's contribution to the global net-growth in coal and 
gas consumption is set to decline after 2020. However, China's share 
of the global coal consumption changes only marginally from the high 
level of 50 percent to 49 percent in 2035.
China's impact on the global growth in oil consumption will further 
increase after 2020, so China's share of the global net growth will expand 
to 57 percent from 2011 to 2035. China's oil consumption will grow sig-
niﬁcantly due to the sharp increases in transport vehicles and private 
cars. At the time of writing, there are 500 cars per 1,000 Europeans, 
while there are only 36 cars per 1,000 Chinese people (Birol 2013), thus 
the potential market is huge. The number of cars has already increased 
from 4 million light duty vehicles in 2000 to about 60 million in 2010; 
this number is expected to rise to 430 million in 2035 (IEA 2013B: 513). 
The consequence of this rise is that China will account for 16 percent 
of global oil consumption in 2035, an increase from 11 percent in 2010. 
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Although China currently uses only 4 percent of the world's natural gas, 
by 2035 it will account for 11 percent of the global gas consumption. 
A notable development is that China will commission so many new 
nuclear plants that it will contribute with 59 percent of the global net-
growth towards 2035. By 2035 one in four of all nuclear power plants 
worldwide is expected to be located in China; in 2011 the ﬁgure was 
only 3 percent. This means that China until 2035 will account for one-
third of the net growth in global energy consumption. While in 1990 
China spent half as much energy as the US, by 2015 China is the world's 
largest energy consumer, a position which is projected to continue until 
2035, when the country will use 81 percent more energy than the US 
(IEA 2013B:  584; 620). 
China's share of global CO2-emissions was 26 percent in 2011. China's 
share of the global net growth will range at 37 percent in the period 2011 
to 2035. Interestingly, the incremental share of renewable energy towards 
2035 is lower in China compared to other countries and regions. China's 
share of net growth in renewable energy ranges at 16 percent, almost 
the same share as China's share of the global total is today.
China's Global Impact on Non-fossil Energy Demand
China's modest contribution to the current as well as incremental global 
growth of renewables until 2035 must be interpreted with caution, as 
traditional biomass for cooking and heating is included in the IEA's 
category of renewable energy. As this traditional use of biomass will be 
replaced by the use of biomass in modern power plants etc., the deploy-
ment of modern renewable technologies will reach a higher share than 
indicated by the global net-growth ﬁgure of 16 percent from 2011 to 
2035. The required statistical method to make international comparisons 
is, however, available for power generation.
China's development of renewable energy has progressed substan-
tially more in the power sector compared to the heat sector, transporta-
tion or other sectors. A large stock of new hydropower plants has been 
installed in recent years. By 2005 China had 117 GW of hydropower, 
which more than doubled to 249 GW in 2012. In 2005 China had 1 GW 
wind turbines on-grid, which rose sharply to 63 GW in 2012. The capac-
ity of biomass-based power plants expanded from 2 GW to 8 GW in 
the same period, while the capacity of solar PV increased from almost 
zero in 2008 to 4 GW in 2012 (CNREC 2013). Nuclear power has also 
increased signiﬁcantly.
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Interestingly, in the Chinese power sector, renewables accounted 
for only slightly more than one-third of the capacity added in 2011, 
compared to almost half worldwide and 71 percent in the EU (REN21 
2012: 13-14). Renewables are expected to comprise 40 percent of China's 
newly installed power capacity in the present Five-Year Plan (2010-15) 
compared to 87 percent worldwide in the same period (Author's calcu-
lations, IEA 2012A: 554; 574). 
However, new ﬁgures on China's new power generation equipment 
in 2013 shed an interesting light on a possible new trend. China's new 
renewable power capacity surpassed new fossil fuel and nuclear capacity 
for the ﬁrst time (REN21 2014: 14). This is backed up by other analyses, 
which suggest a breakthrough for wind power and to a lesser extent 
solar power, thereby supplementing hydropower as a main future 
power source.
Thus, China has commissioned a large stock of all types of power 
generating technologies, both renewables and fossil-based. Measured 
in GW, a large growth in the incremental renewable power plants takes 
place after 2008. However, their relative importance is less impressive, 
as more fossil-based power plants are commissioned, although the most 
recent ﬁgures from 2014 may suggest a new trend with a signiﬁcant in-
crease in commissioned renewable power capacity (National Statistical 
Bureau 2014). It is too early to pass any judgements on a possible new 
green power policy. The most credible scenario, as noted, is developed 
by IEA, which will be elaborated upon below.
China's global share of the incremental power generation towards 
2035 is shown in Figure 4. China's increased demand for renewable-
based power until 2035 will make up almost 30 percent of the global 
incremental demand for renewable electricity. This is much more than 
the ﬁgure of 16 percent for all kinds of renewables, but still less than 
the fossil-based power generation, which contributes almost 40 per-
cent of the global net increase in the power demand based on coal, oil 
and gas. Not surprisingly, China's contribution to the future energy 
growth is much higher than the global share of today, especially for 
nuclear power.
Thus, no evidence of a shift in China's fossil energy demand is at 
hand, neither for the total energy sector nor the power sector alone. The 
share of fossil energy will decline, but the energy demand, the commis-
sioned capacity of coal-ﬁred power plants and increased demand of oil 
in the transportation sector may still continue to grow, even beyond the 
sustainable carrying capacity. The hard fact is that the Chinese govern-
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ment has been forced to devise new and additional green policies: a new 
green trend is possible. This may prove to be a serious challenge, as the 
government has not succeeded in meeting some important renewable 
energy targets in the past. In order to fully understand the present and 
future challenges, the speciﬁcs of local energy governance must be ex-
amined. The energy sector exhibits clear characteristics of a fragmented 
authoritarian mode of government, which will be decisive for China's 
future green development.
Local Opposition to Green Energy
China's centrally formulated green policies do not always ﬁnd solid 
ground at the local level. Common Western assumptions about strong 
top-down rule by the Chinese authoritarian party-state are challenged by 
the fact that economic reform and administrative and economic decen-
tralization since the 1980s have stimulated a federalist trend. This trend 
is rooted in the dual role of local governments in the implementation 
of energy policies. This is partly due to the so-called 'tiao tiao kuai kuai' 
administrative system, which describes the quasi-federal arrangement 
of administration in China. The term tiao refers to the vertical lines of 
authority over various sectors reaching down from the ministries of the 
FIGURE 3. China's Share of Global Net-Growth in Electricity Generation: 
2011-20359
Note: The scenario is based on the assumption that all China's ofﬁcial goals for increased non-fossil 
energy are attained, i.e. IEA's New Policies Scenario.
Source: Author's calculations based on IEA's (2013B) data on electricity generation (TWh).
= Share of global power generation in 2011
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central government. Kuai refers to the horizontal level of authority of 
the territorial government at the provincial or local level (Sinkule and 
Ortolano 1995: 10-21). A local energy or environmental protection bureau 
may have reporting responsibilities to both the central government's 
resort ministry (Ministry of Environment) and to the local city mayor 
or provincial governor, but the decisive say is increasingly concentrated 
by the local authorities.
Thus, the unknown factor is the ability of the party-state to implement 
the various green policies at the local level. China's so-called de facto 
federalism (Andrews-Speed 2012; Montinla et al. 1996: 50-81) entails 
that power is increasingly decentralized and concentrated at the local 
level, albeit still under the direct command of the central ministry. This 
may well prove to be a critical barrier hindering the transition to a more 
green energy sector. In this context, the ability to bring down the share 
of coal in energy production is critical as it will conﬂict with interests 
in the coal producing areas, which produce about 50 percent of China's 
coal (Delman and Odgaard 2014).
More than 30 years of economic reforms have created strong local alli-
ances between enterprise managers and government ofﬁcials. Company 
executives have been allocated the responsibility for their company's 
operations and can retain a large share of proﬁts. The economic man-
agement is often executed through a web of administrative permissions 
and connections, and enterprise managers and party-state ofﬁcials can 
forge strong alliances; their mutual interests often set the local agenda. 
Experience shows that, apart from the leaders of some wealthy cities and 
provinces, they are not easily persuaded to enact costly policies and to 
pay more for cleaner energy, despite pressure from central government 
or possible protests from NGOs and local people.
Local governments are more concerned with providing jobs for the 
many unemployed in order to avoid social unrest. About 128 million 
people still live below one of the national poverty lines of RMB 2,300 
per year (about US$1.8 per day) (World Bank 2013B). If the international 
poverty line of the World Bank is applied (less than 1.25 US$ per person 
in purchasing power parity), 9.2 percent of China's population—or 123 
million people—were poor in 2010 (World Bank 2013C). With the sec-
ond largest number of poor in the world after India, poverty reduction 
remains a fundamental challenge, and long-term investments in clean 
energy and a better environment may receive less priority. 
The de facto authority of the local governments is evident in many ways 
and is relevant to the green energy sector. For example, local tinkering with 
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reporting on ofﬁcial targets is well known, and explains why the central 
government is sometimes compelled to make its own investigations. After 
a national investigation on the local construction of energy plants in 2004, 
the National Development and Reform Commission revealed that con-
struction of a large number of power plants with a combined generating 
capacity of 120 GW had begun without receiving the necessary approval. 
This huge capacity equalled an astonishing 30 percent of China's total 
power generating capacity.10 A relatively large share of these hidden, local 
power plants was coal-based and did not comply with national policies 
for high power efﬁciency. The local need for cheap power without lengthy 
approvals overruled the central policy demands for higher investments 
costs for green energy. To put things into perspective: this unreported 
construction of local power plants represented an increase in the total 
global energy-related CO2 emission of about 2 percent.
11
A similar statistical lacuna mirroring central-local policy discrepan-
cies is found in the reported coal consumption. A team of researchers 
has found signiﬁcant differences between the reported energy con-
sumption ﬁgures cited by the central government and those cited by 
the provinces (Guan et al.: 2012). In 2010, China's aggregated data on 
energy consumption from the provinces was 20 percent higher than that 
reported by the National Statistical Bureau. This discrepancy is mainly 
due to inconsistencies of coal consumption. A possible explanation is 
local over-reporting of GDP, which has caused a corresponding over-
reporting of energy consumption to match the reported GDP. Another 
possible explanation is that the increased focus on sustainable develop-
ment and the delegated targets for achievement of 20 percent improved 
energy intensity during the 11th Five-Year Plan have put pressure on 
local governments to under-report energy consumption (Ibid.).12 The 
research team's analysis speciﬁcally mentioned that many small coal 
mines, like power plants and other polluting industries, have been shut 
down by order of the central government in order to improve energy 
efﬁciency; however many of them have since re-opened or moved their 
operation to another location. This explanation ﬁts well with the inves-
tigation results that cited 30 percent more power capacity than ofﬁcially 
registered. The discrepancy between central and local statistics on actual 
energy consumption in 2010 represents as much as 1.4 Giga Ton CO2, 
i.e. 5 percent of the global total, or the equivalent of the world's fourth 
largest emitter, Japan (Guan et al, 2012). 
These ﬁndings are substantiated by another analysis of the coal sta-
tistics. After Beijing ordered a nationwide closure of many small coal-
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mines in the late 1990s, local governments' unwillingness to cooperate 
resulted in widespread statistical tampering, which had a serious impact 
on reported coal production and consumption. After two revisions in 
2006 and 2010, China's national coal production for 2000 was updated 
with a new ﬁgure that was 39 percent higher. The quality of China's 
coal statistics is deteriorating over time. In 1990, China's national coal 
consumption equalled the summation of the provinces' coal demand. 
In 2000, the national ﬁgure became 4 percent lower, and this statistical 
discrepancy kept widening, reaching 18 percent in 2010.13 
The seemingly uncontrollable local power sector expansion is also 
evident when examining the targets in the Five-Year Plan of 2010-2015. 
As mentioned above, almost  75 percent more coal-ﬁred power plants 
are under construction in the present Five-Year Plan, despite an ofﬁcial 
target of only 45 percent increase. Similarly, while the Five-Year Plan 
put coal production capacity at 4.1 billion tons by 2015, the UOB Kay 
Hian bank and commodity trading group expects a consumption of at 
least 4.7 billion tons (Reuters Point Carbon 2014). The same development 
is seen in the 2012 implementation scheme of the 12th Five-Year Plan 
for coal, where speciﬁc regional caps were set for China's leading coal 
producing provinces. However, preliminary statistics suggested that the 
2012 coal output in the major provinces was 12-18 percent higher than 
their respective caps, according to China Coal Transport and Distribu-
tion Association.14
The local preference for cheap and abundant energy for local industries 
appears to be a major trend, although some city governments and prov-
inces adopt very ambitious green policies. Thus, Shanghai, Beijing, Dalian 
and other local governments are seriously attempting to implement more 
sustainable policies (Economy 2010). If the major trend is to be changed, 
another administrative system and incentive scheme must be adopted. 
Until this happens, the recent green policies may be a temporary phenom-
enon or a phenomenon caused by relatively low economic growth. 
Conclusions and Policy Perspectives
The above quantitative analyses present a picture of a country with 
almost unlimited thirst for energy. All energy sectors are expanding rap-
idly. The government lists ambitious targets for renewable energy and 
nuclear power, but the demand for coal, oil and gas is still enormous.
The global impact can be summed up as follows:
• China has become a net importer of coal, gas and oil. China's de-
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pendence on imported fossil fuels will increase further, and the 
security of supply of oil, in particular, is alarming.
• China's energy consumption is still dominated by coal. The share 
of coal has declined marginally over the past 30 years, but recent 
data show an important growth in the share of non-fossil energy. 
Whether this is a temporary phenomenon or a possible new trend 
depends on the future development of coal-to-gas and coal-to-liq-
uids. 
• China's incremental share of renewable power has been lower than 
that of the US and especially Europe, which will also be the case in 
the ﬁve year period of 2011-2015. However, recent statistics may 
suggest a signiﬁcant higher share of renewable power in the coming 
years.
• China's global share of fossil fuel-based power will increase more 
than its incremental share of renewable electricity towards 2035.
• China will contribute to about half of the global net growth in nu-
clear power, oil and coal demand towards 2035, while the shares 
for gas and renewables range at much lower levels.
• China's share of global CO2-emissions increases at a faster speed 
than its global share of energy consumption.
One may rightly argue that China has the same right to industrialize 
and urbanize its population as other countries, and if coal is at hand 
that is an obvious energy source to use. But China's dilemmas are that 
this path may not lead to the desired development, due to the obstacles 
of lack of security of supply, pollution, water scarcity in coal-endowed 
areas, etc. 
Therefore important and ambitious green targets have been adopted 
by the Chinese government, but several ofﬁcial targets for a more sus-
tainable energy sector have not been attained. These include: 
• The Five-Year Plan target for non-fossil energy in 2006-10 was not 
achieved, even when nuclear power was included in the target. 
• The 2010 targets for increase of non-hydro renewables were not met 
by half of the grid corporations and large energy companies.
• The coal-based power plants seem to be commissioned more exten-
sively than prescribed in the present Five-Year Plan.
• The target of a maximum of 65 percent coal in primary energy de-
mand has been postponed from 2015 to 2017, but may nevertheless 
be attained in 2015, if the most recent statistics signal a new trend.
Some important targets in the Five-Year Plan of 2010-2015 can be 
expected to be achieved. This does not signal a breakthrough for the 
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government's quest for more green policies; it may also be the result of 
modest economic growth. Arguably, a relatively modest growth of 7 
percent until 2020 and 5-6 percent in the next decade is a realistic eco-
nomic growth, which will strongly support a more green energy sector 
in the future. This may prove to be the case.
If China's economy grows more than expected due to an end to the 
low international conjunctures and subsequent economic recovery, or 
because local governments continue to release misleading reports and 
tampered statistics on the actual development, then the realization of 
the endorsed green energy policies seems to hinge on the implementa-
tion of new and additional policies. The most important question at this 
stage is whether or not the central government will be able to replace 
bureaucratic decrees, ineffective sanctions and planning targets with 
more effective tools of implementation.
An important precondition is a reform of the so-called 'tiao tiao kuai 
kuai' administrative system, where the de facto federal governance hin-
ders the implementation of new green energy policies. This accentuates 
a move away from mandatory targets for each administrative level to a 
more incentive-based management system. The market incentives must 
be based on better designed and enforced regulations.15 It is important 
that not only the local authorities but also non-state actors perceive their 
own interest as one of saving on their use of energy resources, which 
will be achieved when energy is properly priced.  The 12th Five-Year 
Plan offers a number of new policies in this regard.
For instance, several carbon credit trading schemes are being imple-
mented on a pilot basis (EIU 2013), which may be the ﬁrst steps towards 
a uniﬁed national scheme. The speciﬁc design of such a national scheme, 
it's monitoring and penalties, and so on, will matter greatly and can be 
an effective means.
A carbon tax on the use of fossil energy by large enterprises16 is ex-
pected on a limited scale, maybe as a pilot scheme. The Ministry of 
Finance introduced the initiative in 2007, but a carbon tax has not yet 
materialized. The ministry proposed in 2010 a tax of 10 yuan/ton CO2, 
increasing to 50 yuan/ton in 2020. If implemented in an optimal way, 
the carbon tax could prove to be an important means to reduce the 
growth in consumption of fossil fuels. The suggested starting level of 
10 yuan/ton is expected to lower GDP only modestly by 0.1 percent 
(Hill 2013) to 0.14 percent in 2020.17 Thus, the economic impact appears 
to be relatively small, but another analysis ﬁnds that a carbon tax of 100 
yuan/ton would necessitate compensatory measures to certain highly 
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affected industries (Wang et al. 2011: 4144-52). The lengthy process of 
implementation surely exposes the Chinese leadership's concerns re-
garding the relatively low growth rates during and after the international 
economic crisis. The overall economic development appears to receive 
higher priority than the green transformation. 
Another challenge for the carbon tax merits attention. Local govern-
ments are likely to ﬁnd ways to undermine the carbon tax, for example 
by compensating local enterprises for large carbon tax payments (An-
drews-Speed 2013). It is not uncommon that the local tax bureau offers a 
reduction in local fees in return, often the exact same amount as the ﬁne 
or charge meted out by the environmental bureaus. There are numer-
ous examples showing that local governments help local enterprises in 
this way, to safeguard local employment and their own tax revenues.18 
Thus, the actual design of the forthcoming carbon tax system will be of 
great importance if it is to raise incentives for using more green fuels 
and to improve energy efﬁciency.
Resource taxes have been imposed on fossil fuels in recent years.19 A 
ﬁxed percentage is now imposed on the sales revenue from oil and gas, 
and a similar levy on volume of coal has been introduced, though the 
latter may be changed to a tax on sales revenue as currently applies to oil 
and gas. Clearly, the levels of these resource taxes have a crucial impact on 
increases in green energy. It has not yet paved the way for attainment of 
ofﬁcial targets for non-fossil fuels, but this may change in the future.
A gradual phase-out of the energy subsidies may gradually bring about 
true cost prices.20 In December 2011, China began testing natural gas 
prices linked with international prices, while the price setting of oil was 
gradually linked to the world market prices during the 11th Five-Year 
Plan. The result is higher prices for end-users. This can be combined 
with earmarked subsidies to vulnerable groups in order to facilitate a 
social consensus. The ﬁrst steps in a price reform for gas is likely to bring 
about more market conducive prices, as has been the case with oil and 
coal (Andrews-Speed 2013A). While the price reforms for gas aims at 
improving the competitiveness of gas versus coal and to provide incen-
tives to explore new reserves of both conventional and unconventional 
gas, the more advanced price reforms for oil and coal aim to alleviate 
the strain on state ﬁnances and to improve energy efﬁciency.
Electricity is subsidized, especially for residential users. In 2012, a 
reform introduced three-tier inclining tariffs for residential users based 
on consumption, i.e. the larger consumers pay a higher tariff (Lin and 
Jiang 2012: 164-73). As this group is typically more afﬂuent, social ten-
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sions are avoided by protecting the low income groups that generally 
consume less electricity. This is likely to develop further, i.e. subsidies 
for greener electricity are increasingly ﬁnanced by the end-users rather 
than the state. A similar three-tier tariff system for households will be 
introduced for natural gas by the end of 2015.21
In short: important political capital has been invested in devising solu-
tions for a more green and sustainable energy sector. Action is now taken 
by more effective regulation by carrot instead of stick, which may bring 
about new means of energy governance, if monitored and followed up 
by new central government initiatives.  Increased social pressure from 
NGOs and local interest groups on the powerful local elites may also 
be inﬂuential, if more profound changes are to evolve.
It is still too early to pass any judgement on the possible outcomes of 
these new reforms and mounting political pressure. Lengthy and very 
locally based power struggles can be expected with a variety of differ-
ent means and outcomes.
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NOTES
1  Even if coals share of the total energy consumption fell by 1.8 pct. points in just 
two years, the absolute consumption of coal increased by 4 per cent in the same 
period.
2  Well over 90 per cent of China's thermal power plants use water-cooling. About 12 
per cent of the recycled cooling water evaporates, implying that the system needs 
be completely replenished every eight years. By the end of 2010, only 5 per cent of 
the power generation involved dry cooling. New thermal plants may be equipped 
with such air-cooling technology, which withdraw less water, but these technologies 
are more expensive to build and incur a higher coal consumption loss due to their 
lower energy efﬁciency. Thus, dry cooling causes a higher consumption coal and a 
higher emission of CO2 (Chan 2013). 
3   Schneider, K. 2013. 'Coal is China's Largest Industrial Water Consumer'. Available 
at http://grist.org/article/2011-02-23-coal-is-chinas-largest-industrial-water-con-
sumer/. 
4  See Bullard, N. 2013. 'China's power utilities in hot water: Executive summary'. 
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Bloomberg - New Energy Finance, 25 March 2013. Available at http://about.bnef.
com/files/2013/03/BNEF_ExecSum_2013-03-25_China-power-utilities-in-hot-
water.pdf.
5  BP 2011. Statistical Review of World Energy-June 2011, available at www.bp.com/sta-
tisticalreview.
6  Coal-ﬁred power plants stand for more than half of China's total coal consumption, 
and emit over 40 per cent of China's SO2 and NOx pollutants. Primo 2012, China's 
new pollutant emissions standard for coal power plants went into effect. These 
standards shall bring Chinese power plants in line with developed world standards 
in important respects (WRI 2012A).
7  Yale University 2014. Environmental Performance Index 2014. Available at http://epi.
yale.edu/epi/country-proﬁle/china.
8  Sources: The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Medium and 
long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China, September 2007; The State 
Council, China's Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-2015); Hu Jintao, Speech to UN General 
Assembly September 2009, New York Times, 22 September 2009; Bloomberg, 'Will 
China's New Renewable Portfolio Standard Boost Project Development?', Renewable 
energy – Research Note, 11 May 2012; International Energy Agency, Understanding 
China's 12th Five-Year Plan, February 2013, IEA/SGD(2013)9. Guo Fa [2013], No.37 
State Council, Beijing, 2013; Simon Quemin & Wen Wang, Overview of Climate 
Change Policies and Development of Emissions Trading in China, Information and 
Debate Series, No. 30, March 2014, Paris-Dauphine University; IEA, China's Climate 
Policy, 5 January 2015, IEA/SGD(2015)2.
9  China's share of the global net-growth in nuclear energy does not correspond to 
the seemingly same share shown in Figure 3. This ﬁgure shows the net-growth in 
total energy demand, which includes transmission loss of energy etc., while Figure 
3 shows the electricity generation without loss of process energy, etc.
10  China Daily, 29 November 2004.
11  Own calculation based on data from IEA 2012C: 5; and IEA 2012B.
12  The 20 per cent low ﬁgure for energy consumption is the ofﬁcial data. This ﬁgure 
of 3,249 million ton coal equivalents is also listed in Table 1.
13  Jianjun Tu, K. 2012. 'China's Problematic Coal Plan'. The Diplomat, 18 April 2012. 
Available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/chinas-problematic-coal-plan/. 
14  China Oil Trader 2013. 'China's Plan to Cap Coal Consumption and Production Needs 
Political Accountability and Accurate Statistical Reporting to Succeed', 28 January 
2013, at http://www.chinaoiltrader.com/?p=364.
15  In China, the maximum statutory ﬁne for refusing to report emissions data is only 
50,000 yuan and penalties for exceeding emission standards can only reach twice 
that at 100,000 yuan. See Andrews, S. 2013. 'How Beijing Hid the Smog'. Wall Street 
Journal, 5 February 2013. Available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1
0001424127887324445904578285560136861562. Andrews 2013). The penalties are 
expected to be raised in the near future.
16  The Draft Law on Addressing Climate Change, published in May 2012, includes 
mention of both cap-and-trade schemes and a carbon tax. Already in 2010, the 
Ministry of Finance suggested levying a carbon tax in 2012 at 10 yuan per ton CO2, 
which should increase to 50 Yuan per ton by 2020. People's Daily, 20 February 2013. 
The stated time for the commence of carbon tax was later excluded due to a lower 
than expected economic growth. See Lin, L. 2013. 'No timetable for carbon tax say 
Chinese ofﬁcial'. China Dialogue. Available at https://www.chinadialogue.net/ar-
ticle/show/single/en/6242-No-timetable-for-carbon-tax-say-Chinese-ofﬁcials.
17  WRI 2013A. Based on the Harvard China Project, Clearer Skies Over China: Reconciling 
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Air Quality, Climate, and Economic Goals, (2013, MIT Press). Another thorough study 
ﬁnds that a carbon tax of 50 Yuan/ton will reduce GDP by 0.19 per cent. This tax 
rate would reduce CO2 emission by 3.1 per cent compared to a business-as-usual 
scenario, which is much lower than the 19 per cent found in the above WRI study 
(Lu et al. 2010).
18  Economist, 19 August 2004. 'China's environment: A great wall of waste'. A broad 
study of environmental legal proceedings in China has shown that half of the charges 
brought against enterprises were turned down by local authorities, including the 
local party organization, based on the argument that the outcome of such cases could 
threaten local social stability, something which is a prime concern for the party-state 
(Wang 2010).
19  The National Bureau of Taxation reports that resource tax revenue rose from 6,286 
billion Yuan in 1999 to 30,164 billion yuan in 2008, but declined slightly as a propor-
tion of total tax revenues from 0.61 per cent to 0.52 per cent over the same period 
(IISD and CNREC 2013: 4).
20  Based on an input-output model analysis of China's energy prices, the magnitude of 
China's subsidies amounted to 4.04 per cent in 2008 (Jiang and Tan 2013). According 
to IEA, China has the sixth largest energy subsidies in the world (IEA 2013B: 95). 
21  See Thomson Reuter. 'China to introduce tiered gas prices for household users.' 
21 March 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/21/china-gas-pricing-
idUKL3N0MI2H220140321. Accessed 29 April 2015.
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